The Death Penalty in Canada Essay -- Capital Punishment, canadian stud

The most severe of all sentences: death. Also known as capital punishment, this is the most severe form of punishment in the courts as it is requires law enforcement officers to kill the offender. Our past has left us thinking that if someone steals from us, we should steal from them, or if someone yells at us, we should yell at them. But does there ever come a point where if someone kills somebody, we should kill them? Today, there is a large controversy over the death penalty, whether it helps society or not, and if it is morally right. When we find someone guilty of murder and sentence them to death; does that not make murderers out of us? Is the death penalty an unnecessary punishment, or is it now a necessity in the battles of crime? With the increase in crime and violence in our society, how does the death penalty affect a North American family? Canada’s history with this punishment has been stable for several years. In the late 1800’s until the 1960’s, all murders in Canada were promised a death of hanging. Between these dates, there were 710 Canadians murdered. Many of them were found to be innocent years after their death. The last execution in Canada was on December 11, 1962 when 2 men were hanged in Toronto, Ontario. It wasn’t until July 14, 1976 that the House of Commons passed a Bill that was to abolish capital punishment from the Canadian Criminal Code, and replacing it with a mandatory life sentence for all murderers. Since then, the Canadian government has seen the murder rate increase, and has struggled in the decision to bring back capital punishment, although recent studies suggest that there are four major issues that should make governments stay away from that decisi... ...iety understands the price, so why do we keep doing it? Like anything else in this world, it’s a form of insurance that the criminal will never commit another crime again. (Capital Punishment) As children, we grow up and learn that murder is wrong, but it is still done every day. Dealing with capital punishment, leads to many questions that many citizens even in Canada cannot find an answer to. Is killing somebody for committing a crime right? I personally believe that a victim on death row should be there if they actually deserve to be. Depending on the situation and the crime they committed, the death penalty eliminates evil in our countries. But can people make mistakes, can people be forgiven and change? Using the death penalty is breaking one of the Ten Commandments, so at the end of the day is it right? Does one life deserve another?

Characterization in Harriet Beecher Stowes Minister without a Pulpit :: Harriet Beecher Stowe Minister Pulpit Essays

Characterization in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Minister without a Pulpit Harriet Beecher Stowe uses characterization and a tragic situation to portray the contrast of the bourgeois and the proletariat classes and the social movements within the class structure. The first character appearing in the story is a little girl whose mother has just died. The descriptions of her are vague, and the name of this child is not revealed until late in the story. Throughout the story, the little girl is referred to as â€Å" ‘ere,† â€Å"beautiful little girl of seven years,† â€Å"little girl,† â€Å"little one,† and â€Å"child.† Only when she is asked for her name do the readers learn that it is Eglantine Percival. Even after her name has been revealed, none of the characters use her name. This absence of a name indirectly reflects Eglantine’s position in society after her mother’s death. Stowe uses vague words like â€Å"child† to show the subordination of Eglantine as a result of Miss Asphyxia’s demands. Before Eglantine is taken in, she held a high status with her mother and brother Harry. Her mother dies, and her brother is taken away from her along with â€Å"money enough† to pay for her mother’s funeral. The loss of these material possessions must coincide with a loss of high status according to Karl Marx. Dropping from bourgeois, Eglantine falls into the proletariat status. She does not submit entirely to the social structure at first. In fact, she resents the work Miss Asphyxia demands of her saying that she â€Å"wants to play.† Eglantine still dreams of her previous leisurely lifestyle where she had no responsibilities, where flowers were beautiful, and where her mother â€Å"always brushed them [her curls] out everyday.† She refuses Miss Asphyxia’s authority on a few occasions, but her efforts end with her own tears and eventual obedience. As her possessions escape her, Eglantine becomes more and more submissive to Miss Asphyxia and more proletariat status-like. Contrasting Eglantine is her benefactor Miss Asphyxia. She is a working woman, older and stronger. Miss Asphyxia is a â€Å"working machine, always wound up and going.† She understood that â€Å"nature had made her†¦entirely for use.† She described herself having nothing but bone and muscle, purely with practical and efficient uses. The use of Miss Asphyxia’s name is quite interesting. The short story is unexpectedly named after her although it seems that Eglantine is the main character of the story. Characterization in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Minister without a Pulpit :: Harriet Beecher Stowe Minister Pulpit Essays Characterization in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Minister without a Pulpit Harriet Beecher Stowe uses characterization and a tragic situation to portray the contrast of the bourgeois and the proletariat classes and the social movements within the class structure. The first character appearing in the story is a little girl whose mother has just died. The descriptions of her are vague, and the name of this child is not revealed until late in the story. Throughout the story, the little girl is referred to as â€Å" ‘ere,† â€Å"beautiful little girl of seven years,† â€Å"little girl,† â€Å"little one,† and â€Å"child.† Only when she is asked for her name do the readers learn that it is Eglantine Percival. Even after her name has been revealed, none of the characters use her name. This absence of a name indirectly reflects Eglantine’s position in society after her mother’s death. Stowe uses vague words like â€Å"child† to show the subordination of Eglantine as a result of Miss Asphyxia’s demands. Before Eglantine is taken in, she held a high status with her mother and brother Harry. Her mother dies, and her brother is taken away from her along with â€Å"money enough† to pay for her mother’s funeral. The loss of these material possessions must coincide with a loss of high status according to Karl Marx. Dropping from bourgeois, Eglantine falls into the proletariat status. She does not submit entirely to the social structure at first. In fact, she resents the work Miss Asphyxia demands of her saying that she â€Å"wants to play.† Eglantine still dreams of her previous leisurely lifestyle where she had no responsibilities, where flowers were beautiful, and where her mother â€Å"always brushed them [her curls] out everyday.† She refuses Miss Asphyxia’s authority on a few occasions, but her efforts end with her own tears and eventual obedience. As her possessions escape her, Eglantine becomes more and more submissive to Miss Asphyxia and more proletariat status-like. Contrasting Eglantine is her benefactor Miss Asphyxia. She is a working woman, older and stronger. Miss Asphyxia is a â€Å"working machine, always wound up and going.† She understood that â€Å"nature had made her†¦entirely for use.† She described herself having nothing but bone and muscle, purely with practical and efficient uses. The use of Miss Asphyxia’s name is quite interesting. The short story is unexpectedly named after her although it seems that Eglantine is the main character of the story.

English Term paper -- essays research papers

1984 is a novel of great influence. The novel illustrates many concepts of life in the future through the knowledge of the past. The descriptive theories within the novel are familiar in basic context when we look into the society of today. The author George Orwell has projected an image of the future through the knowledge of his lifetime, which is not far off reality. The novel talks about the social movement to a world of unbearable proportions, which takes the idea of security to the limit. A feeling of helplessness is bestowed upon the people as the government scrutinizes their every move. The government has created a society of fear, and people automatically fall into line for they cannot escape the eyes of Big Brother who is watching them. Many of the major concepts outlined in detail in the novel are applicable to life in the twenty-first century. The author has defined concepts for several areas, which he perceived the world would progress towards. Orwell’s prophecies as illustrated in the novel 1984 are fulfilled in today’s society. One of the major prophecies that Orwell outlines in his novel is the idea of the telescreen which can watch anyone at any time this is a reality in today’s society. One of the major connections that Orwell makes about the telescreen of 1984 and today’s society is that you could spy on people. The telescreen might be the most closely compared to microphones and cameras, but there are also many other devices that can be easily used for spying. Within the area of the telescreen anyone could be watched as well as heard, which closely links to the surveillance of today, except people are a little more naive. â€Å"Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so as long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.†(Orwell, 6) The notion that â€Å"Big broth er is watching you† from the novel is not that far off. In fact cameras are being installed all over the place for security reasons, but you do not know who is watching you and what kind of personal information you are giving away. â€Å"No matter how far our contemporary world may seem to 1984’s Oceania, any suggestion of government surveillance of its citizens--from the thre... ...clearly outlines several theories of his within the novel, which have come true in modern day. George Orwell’s first prophecy is about a piece of technology, which we can quite easily relate to modern day because it is quite like a television or a communication device such as a camera or microphone. This was important since it was one of the main ideas of his novel, relating to spying, and it has become quite prominent within our society as well as in the novel. Next the author outlines the type of government, which is quite overpowering, which again in co-ordinance with the telescreen presents one of the main ideas in the plot of the novel and is quite emphasized. The type of governance described is in effect in some countries around the world today. Finally the author has described in detail the use of a new language that has become useful for brainwashing, and government propaganda. This language can be related to today as we have created a new language of our own for s pecial purposes and there are places that deal with a double languages, just as in the novel. The concepts that this novel introduces are so realistic that it has influenced many around the world for many years.

Colleges Exploit of College Athletes Essay

It is common issue in our country that students neglect their studies seeking sports fame and they end up their career with incomplete degree, even while their institution themselves earn millions revenues. It is seen that as sports became very commercializing, college sport department exploit students for their own means of earning. A sign that hangs in the men’s basketball locker room at Duke Reads: â€Å"Practice times are as follows†¦. Please schedule class consequently. † (Sarah E. Gohl, 2001) This sign expresses in no indecisive terms the message that basketball, not school, is the top priority. The academic schedule should accommodate the athletic schedule, not vice versa. Duke’s basketball coaches are not unaided in making this demand. Division I coaches normally require athletes to subordinate their academic lives to their athletic lives. Damion Davis, a track and field athlete at Baylor University, told the Chronicle of Higher Education: â€Å"They [coaches] always say its academics [first], then athletics. They’re lying. Its athletics and then academics. You don’t carry out, you’re not here† (Alex P. Kellogg, 2001, pp. A33-A34). Baylor football player Bobby Darnell agreed. Referring to his coaches, he said: â€Å"They don’t want you thinking about the test you have on Monday, just the ‘test’ you have Saturday night,† explicitly, the next football game (Alex P. Kellogg, 2001, pp. A33-A34). In this environment, according to sociologists Patricia and Peter Adler, athletes might become â€Å"engulfed† in their athletic role, giving it priority, and may â€Å"abandon† their academic role, casting aside the non-athletic goals to which they formerly aspired (Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler, 1991). Wherever role engulfment exists, academic fraud is certain to follow. Academic fraud not just takes place when a student cheats on an examination or submits a plagiarized paper, or while a high school or college coach or administrator falsifies an athlete’s transcription, but also takes place whenever a college authorizes athletes to be something other than fall-time college students who are joined in degree programs and who pursue their degrees at a rational pace. It surely occurs when coaches arrange course schedules to make sure those athletes will be available for daily practice and that they will earn the grades essential to stay eligible to compete. Coaches did just that at the Division I college where the Adlers studied the men’s basketball team throughout the late 1980s. One player described his â€Å"choice† of a major in the following way: â€Å"They never even asked me what major I wanted. They just assumed that I would be a rec [recreation-physical education] major. They’re perhaps right, but you get a certain message when they don’t even ask you. † (Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler, 1991, 67) The message, of course, is that one’s sport comes first and schoolwork is a slight irritant to which one require only pay enough attention to stay eligible to compete. At fall registration some years ago, former Drake University provost Jon Ericson witnessed an incident linking a freshman men’s basketball player who had received this message. The athlete sat impassively while a envoy of the athletic department chose his classes and got him registered. At the same time Ericson observed, in stark contrast to the athlete, a young woman student who moved from line to line and negotiated with the registrar as she chose her classes, â€Å"engulfed† suitably in the role of undergraduate (Katie Funk, 2000). Athletes also accept the message that their sport comes first while coaches force them to subordinate their academic targets to their athletic responsibilities. One of the Adlers’ interviewees recalled the following conversation with a coach, which illustrates this dilemma vividly. The player said: One time I had a paper that was really hard that was due. So I say to Coach Mickey [the â€Å"academic† coach], â€Å"I’m goanna be a little late to practice because I have to go to the library to do some work on my paper. † But he told me, â€Å"You’d better be in the gym by three o’clock. † I think if they were serious about academics, they would cut you some slack on that (Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler, 1991, p 150). Ironically, athlete exploitation sometimes occurs even while a college does not stand to earn considerable revenues from sports. A case in point is Marcus LoVett, formerly the star point guard for Oklahoma City University (OCU), a perennial basketball powerhouse in the National Association for Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), where visibility is low and profits are unusual. LoVett enrolled at OCU in the fall of 1995, following spending his first two years of college at Hutchinson Community College in Kansas and the College of Southern Idaho, respectively (Alexander Wolff, 1997, pp. 60-66). He remained entitled for basketball at OCU in 1995-96 by taking courses in fishing/angling, beginning volleyball, beginning golf, intramural recreation programs, walking/jogging, varsity sports, and the basics of coaching basketball, and postponed until his senior year the more hard courses that he would need to pass in order to graduate with a degree in physical education. This strategy backfired in December of 1996, when LoVett failed three courses and took an unfinished in two others, causing his GPA to fall below the 2. 0 necessary for athletic eligibility under NAIA rules. OCU declared him disqualified to play basketball during the spring semester, where he filed suit in state court in January of 1997, claiming that OCU had (1) broken its promise to have him tested quickly for Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD); (2) failed to provide him with the academic assistance it had promised him, (3) destitute him of a chance to showcase his basketball talents for NBA scouts, and (4) inflicted emotional distress on him (Cohen Greta, 1993. ). The presence of the poor athlete in American schools, his wish to secure the advantages of a college education, and his incapability or unwillingness to distinguish between proper and improper assistance have combined to turn out a fertile field in which to sow the tares of commercialized exploitation and subsidies. Basically, sports always have been attraction to students in their campuses that influenced the commercialization of college sports. Indeed, without the pressure on colleges to raise enrollments and to generate revenue, it is unlikely that college sports would have become a commercial enterprise. In more positive financial circumstances, colleges would not have felt a need to make the monetary commitments and the ethical compromises that commercial success in sports essential to athletes. Colleges in aspiring to win also initiated unethical practices. Chief among these is the enrollment of athletes with little or no regard for their academic qualifications. Some colleges usually hired â€Å"tramp athletes† to represent them on the football field, knowing full well that these athletes had no aim of matriculating as students, or even of playing a full season. An egregious instance occurred in 1896 and featured Fielding H. Yost, who later became famous as the football coach at the University of Michigan. Yost, a â€Å"hefty, six-foot tall, 195-pound tackle for West Virginia University, † â€Å"transferred† to Lafayette College in Pennsylvania in the autumn of 1896, just eventually to play in the most important football game in Lafayette’s history, against the University of Pennsylvania. Penn brought a 36-game winning streak into its game with Lafayette, but Lafayette ended the streak with a 6-4 win, aided by Yost. Soon after the game, Yost transferred back to West Virginia University, where he completed work for a law degree six months later (Hart-Nibbrig Nand, and Clement Cottingham, 1986). Moreover, it is usually said that â€Å"every athlete is a needy athlete. † That football players, and, other athletes, come from families whose means do not allow them to pay all of the expenses of a college course is usually accepted as fact and, indeed, is broadly true. To the wide-ranging rule that many college athletes are either wholly or partially self-supporting, there are, certainly, exceptions. But when such instances are distributed among the 800-odd colleges and universities reporting to the United States Bureau of Education, almost all of which retain football teams, the well-to-do athlete becomes something of a rarity. Assistance extended to athletes who otherwise would not have thought of going to college, though it increases the disproportion; only emphasizes a condition that is grounded in much deeper causes. Athletic scholarships are in fact important for college athletes. The benefit is not often paid in cash. The partial or complete lessening of tuition through athletic scholarships generally entailed and often takes place in the offices of the institution, which devise methods of award to suit local conditions and the requirements of athletes. Values of athletic scholarships range from part or full tuition at the lower end of the scale, to allotments graduated in amount according to the number of teams for which the recipient is chosen.

The Third Leg in the Strategy Tripod †Institutional Based View

THE THIRD LEG IN THE STRATEGY TRIPOD – Institutional Based View Introduction Strategy has come to play a significant role in international business (IB) in recent times. This is predicated on the fact of complexities associated with globalisation. The interplay of various factors of production in an environment could have been sufficient for MNEs in taking investment decisions. However, experience has shown otherwise. In this light, strategising in the international business arena has been dominated by industry and resource based views, somewhat ignoring the magnitude of institutional impact on investment decisions.EVALUATION OF ‘THE THIRD LEG IN THE STRATEGY â€Å"TRIPOD†Ã¢â‚¬â„¢ According to Peng et al (2008), citing Porter(1980) Barney (1991) the industry-based view is rooted in the assumption that the strategy employed by MNEs is determined by the conditions within the industry of focus. Also, the resource based view tends to narrow performance and internation al business strategy to resources in specific firms. The aggregated views are functions of research findings carried out in environments whose institutions are seemingly standardised and stable.Meanwhile these views have not been able to deal with the nagging questions posed by strategy as regards investment locations. Recent research directions have established remarkable differences in the institutional frameworks of emerging economies relative to developed economies. This is largely due to long history of cultural, legal and political platforms that organise their businesses. According to Peng et al (2008), the effect of these formal and informal institutions are quite remarkable in shaping strategies and performance even in developed economies.This may not have come to the front burner without recent research on the relationship between institutions and organisational strategies in emerging economies. Peng et al (2008) are of the view that earlier approach to international IB st rategy did not offer institutions appropriate place in the strategy discourse. In furtherance to this, Peng et al (2008) argue that the institutions should actually be recognised as the third leg in the strategy tripod. The other legs being resource based and industry based views.Let us explore the institutions and how they impact IB strategies. In understanding an institution, the renowned Economist Searle (2005 pp. 21) defines an institution as ‘any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts’. It follows that the institutions set the rules for doing business in any environment. As such an MNE is only going to be successful where it understands, assimilates and applies the rules of the environment for competitive advantage.Peng et al’s (2008) argument on the institutional view of strategy focuses on legal, social and political aspects as these have been found to change quite significantly in emergin g economies upon both internal and external impacts. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FOUR CASES OFFERED IN SUPPORTING THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT Peng et al (2008) posit that in transacting business in a developed economy, the supporting institutions operate albeit silently at the background. This is in contrast to the situation in emerging economies where the weight of institutions plays visible roles in consummating transactions.These visible roles have tendencies to alter the business equation in favour of MNEs who have taken proactive steps in influencing the institutional outcomes. Place this fact side by side the growing importance of emerging economies, it becomes imperative that institutional view of strategy becomes as important as the traditional views. Emerging economies like China and India are great examples where institutions’ actions and inactions play great roles in balancing the IB strategy tripod. Growing The Firm In ChinaPeng et al (2008) note that it is puzzling to see Chin a growing economically in the midst of underdeveloped institutional framework. This growth could not have taken place on the strength of the industry and resource based views alone. Peering deeply, Peng et al (2008) Wong (2012) recognise the cultural influences that abound in Chinese business climate which border on social and family networks otherwise referred to as guanxi. This may have phenomenally replaced the formal institution, as such affects the success of businesses within the environment.Peng et al (2008) suggest that in economic environments where institutions are week, norms and cognition take over as game changers. This highlights the import of institution based view in IB strategies. Competing In And Out Of India The meteoric rise of India in the area of IT and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) was attributed to resource and industry based view of IB strategy (Peng et al 2008). These views are based on the opinion that cheap labour, excellent skills and virtuality are major factors responsible for their growth.Nonetheless, institutional considerations are found to be quite relevant in India’s context. Considerations in the areas of education subsidy to top Universities and various economic reforms including liberalisation by government institutions played crucial roles in making India a competitive environment for investments (Peng et al 2008). These institutional references can conveniently stand as the third tripod of the IB strategy. Antidumping As Entry Barriers Market-based variables as noted by Peng et al (2008) have been alleged as the basic entry barriers in IB.Meanwhile non market based institutional variables have been largely ignored in IB startegies.. Trade barriers have come to play important roles in IB strategies. Countries in protecting their local business players against foreign competition usually set up institutional policies aimed at stemming imports by foreign MNEs. These MNEs are alleged to compete unfavourably thro ugh the process of dumping. Davis (2009) citing the 1947 GATT agreement defines dumping as a situation where goods originating from a country are imported into another country at less than normal values.The use of anti-dumping laws by developed countries against MNEs from developing countries is a good example of how an institutional policy could be a tool of trade barrier in IB. Western countries have used this tool of protectionism against competition from Asia quite effectively. The issue here is that when market-based forces fail, antidumping laws could be deployed by local firms to ward off MNEs, thus firming the position of institutional based view as the third leg in the IB strategy tripod. Governing The Corporation In Emerging Economies Corporate governance is highly a determinant in firm performance in developed countries.This is due to the fact that the agency theory focuses on separation of ownership and control. These are exemplified by principal-manager conflicts (Peng et al 2008) quite unlike a lot of emerging economies where principal-principal conflict is the norm. The ability of an MNE to invest in such an environment would mean understanding the value and complexities of concentrated ownership and strategising accordingly. CONCLUSION It is evident from the work of Peng et al (2008) and other researchers that institution-based view has come to occupy the third leg of the IB strategy discourse.It is pertinent to note that the emergence of the institution based view does not in any way diminish the importance of the traditional based views in IB strategy. Instead it complements the traditional views, thus balancing the IB strategy in form of a tripod. It is my opinion that this tripod leverages on industry-based view, resource-based view and institutional-based view for balance. While Peng et al (2008) referenced most of their arguments on developing economies, the institutional effects are found to be applicable in developed countries as well. References Davis L. 2009) ‘Ten years of anti-dumping in the EU: economic and political targeting’. ECIPE Working Paper †¢ No. 02/2009 (Online) Available from: http://www. ecipe. org/media/publication_pdfs/ten-years-of-anti-dumping-in-the-eu-economic-and-political-targeting. pdf (Accessed September 26, 2012) Peng, M. W. , Wang, D. Y. L. & Jiang, Y. (2008) ‘An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies’,Journal of International Business Studies,  39 (5), July/August, pp. 920–936. (Online) Available at: http://dx. doi. org. ezproxy. liv. ac. k/doi:10. 1057/palgrave. jibs. 8400377 (Accessed September 23) Searle J. (2005) ‘What is an institution? ’ Journal of Institutional Economics (2005), 1: 1, 1–22 (Online) Available from: http://www. laisumedu. org/DESIN_Ibarra/desin/pdf-seminario2006/seminario-2006-04d. pdf (Accessed September 24, 2012) Wong J. (2012) ‘The Guanxi Strategie s of Taiwanese Firms in China’s Economic Reforms’ The Journal of Global Business Management Volume 8 * Number 1 * February 2012. (Online) Available at: http://www. jgbm. org/page/15%20Jeng-Min%20Wong. pdf (Accessed September 24, 2012)

Two Peg Test

FIELD WORK TITLE FIELD WORK TITLE Two peg test INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION Two Peg Test is a surveying operation carried out to determine whether the leveling bubble and telescope line of sight are parallel. OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE Peg Test is a surveying operation carried out to determine if the leveling bubble (bubble axis) and telescope line-of-sight (line of collimation) are parallel. TOOLS TOOLS Dumpy levelTripod Staff Tape Bubble staff FIELD WORK PROCEDURE FIELD WORK PROCEDURE . Each group is required to perform a peg test to check the instrument. ii. Each person in the group is record the results of the Peg Test in their own field book. iii. Set out and mark on the ground (with wooden pegs driven into the ground) two point some 15 m apart. iv. Instrument is set up midway between two point A and B. v. Staff is read on each staff point A and point B and the height difference is calculated. Made sure the bubble staff is center vi. Next, instrument is moved about 5m behind the point B. nd staff at point A and point B is read. vii. Record the data. RESULT RESULT Point A1 – point B1 =1. 312 – 1. 310 =0. 002m Point A2 – point B2 =1. 239 – 1. 238 =0. 001m STN 1 – STN 2 = 0. 002 – 0. 001 =0. 001m =1mm ? <  ± 2mm ANALYSIS ANALYSIS The error is  ±2mm so it can be accepted. The instrument is in good condition and can used in field work. CONCLUSION CONCLUSION The instrument can be determined the leveling bubble (bubble axis) and telescope line-of-sight (line of collimation) are parallel.

Macroeconomics – institutions by Acemoglu

In Progress. Abstract: In this paper, we discuss how and why institutions— broadly, the economic and political organization of societies— affect economic incentives and outcomes. After briefly surveying a number of theories of institutional differences across countries, we focus on two questions: why societies may choose institutions that are not good for economic development, and why institutions, even bad Institutions, persist.In light of the Ideas we develop, we discuss three case studies of Institutions alluding and persistence: the united States, India and Guatemala. L. Introduction Institutions, defined broadly as the political and economic organization of societies, differ markedly across countries and over time. For example, until recently, a large number of societies were organized along socialist lines, with widespread collective ownership of the means of production and centrally planned resource allocation, while much of the rest of the world was capitalist, with predominantly private ownership and resources allocated Vela markets.For much of the 1 8th and 9th centuries, a number of societies, Including the Caribbean, much of Central and Latin America, and parts of Asia, were organized with political and economic power concentrated in the hands of a small elite, and relied on productive relationships based on slavery and forced labor. In contrast, economic and political power was more equally distributed in parts of Europe, North America and Australia, and the majority of laborers were free.Similarly, as emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), North and Whiniest (1989) and Till (1 990), there were Important differences In the organization of the European societies during the 17th century. While England and the Netherlands had developed limited governments, France and Spain had absolutist regimes.Economic theory and basic common sense suggest that differences in the organization of society should have an effect on economic outcomes: when institutions ensure that a potential investor has property rights over the proceeds from his Investments, he Is more likely to invest than when he expects the fruits of his efforts to be taken by other parties In the economy or by the government. An obvious hypothesis is then to link variations in economic performance across countries to their institutions. We refer to this point of view as the institutions hypothesis.According to one version of this hypothesis, what is crucial is whether the organization of the society ensures that a broad cross-section of the society have effective property rights, so that those with productive emphasis on â€Å"a broad cross-section of the society' is meant to capture the notion that it is not sufficient for the rights of a small elite, landowners, dictators or Politburo members, to be enforced. Citizens need to have effective property rights, and be involved in politics, at least some degree, to ensure the continuation of these repertory rights in the future.Do we see marked differences in the economic performance of societies with different institutions? The examples mentioned in the first paragraph suggest so: while West Germany prospered with a capitalist system, East Germany did much less well under socialism. While Western Europe, North America and Australia grew rapidly, the elite-dominated societies of the Caribbean, Central America and India stagnated throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. As emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), while England and the Netherlands prospered during the 17th century, Spain and France failed to do so.Also telling are cases where large changes in institutions are correlated with radically changed growth paths. Examples of this are Argentina in the sass's with the rise of populism and Person, South Korea during the early sass's with the transition from the Rhea to the Park regime, and Indonesia in 1965 with the transition between Saguaro and Short. In addition to these selective examp les, much empirical evidence suggests that institutional differences are a major source of the differences in economic performance across countries.For example, cross-country work by a number of economists and political scientists found a first-order effect of institutions on growth or the level of income (e. G. , Knack and Keeper, 1995, or Hall and Jones, 1999). More recently, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) we found that as much as % of the income gap between the top and bottom of the world income distribution may be due to differences in their institutions. 4 But these findings pose as many questions as they answer: 1 . If some institutions generate more income and growth, why do a large number of societies adopt institutions that are bad for economic development? . Why do institutions that are detrimental to economic performance persist rather than being overhauled at the first opportunity? Despite the importance of these questions for understanding differences in econ omic performance across countries, there is relatively little research on this topic. In this paper, we develop a number of conjectures related to these questions. Then, in light of these ideas, we discuss three case studies of institution building and persistence: the U. S. , India and Guatemala.In the process, we also provide a brief survey of a number of theories of comparative institutions. II. Institutions As emphasized in the introduction, our focus is on the set of institutions— the organization of society— that determine economic incentives. Why such institutions and social arrangements will affect economic outcomes is clear: economic actors will only undertake investments when they expect to be rewarded for their spending and effort. In a society where property rights are not well enforced, investment and output will be low.We therefore take the degree of enforcement of property rights to be a central feature of the institutions and the broad organization of a society. To of private property, which we take to correspond to a set of institutions ensuring that a broad cross-section of society have effective property rights. 2. Extractive institutions, which place political power in the hands of a small elite. With extractive institutions, the majority of the population does not have effective property rights, since the political power of the elite means that they can hold up the citizens after they undertake their investments.We expect institutions of private property to encourage investment and development, while extractive institutions are less likely to dead to high investment and successful economic outcomes. Notice that there is more to institutions than the legal code or the formal definition of property rights at a point in time; in particular, political institutions matter. This is for the simple reason that in a society where there are few constraints on political elites, these agents can change the legal code or manipulate the ex isting property rights to their advantage. Therefore, effective constraints on political elites are an essential ingredient of institutions of private property. In reality, there are many intermediate cases teens the extremes of institutions of private property and extractive institutions, and a complex interaction between the exact form of the political and economic institutions and whether they provide effective property rights protection to citizens. There is also a deep and difficult question of how the state commits to providing property rights to the citizens (see Whiniest, 1997, for a discussion of this problem).To limit the discussion, we do not focus on these issues. So what determines whether a society ends up with institutions of private property or extractive institutions? Let us distinguish four broad theories, which we call: 1. The efficient institutions view. 2. The incidental institutions view. 3. The rent-seeking view. 4. The inappropriate institutions view. We now discuss what we mean by these different views, and examine some selective examples of institutional theories falling within each category. . The Efficient Institutions View According to this view, societies will choose the institutions that maximize their total surplus. How this surplus will be distributed among different groups or agents does not affect the choice of institutions. The underlying reasoning of this view comes from the Cease Theorem. Ronald Cease (1960) argued that when different economic parties could negotiate costless, they will be able to bargain to internalize potential externalities.The farmer, who suffers from the pollution created by the nearby factory, can pay the factory owner to reduce pollution. The same reasoning can be applied to political situations. If the current laws or institutions benefit a certain group while creating a disproportionate cost for another, these two groups can negotiate to change the institutions. By doing so they will increase the size of the total surplus (â€Å"the pie† that they have to divide between themselves), and they can hen bargain over the distribution of this additional surplus.Many different versions of the efficient institutions view have been proposed. Demesne (1967) argued that private property emerged from common property when land become sufficiently scarce and valuable that it was efficient to privative it. Other famous examples are Case's (1936) earlier work and the more formal analysis by Grossman and Hart (1986), is more concerned with the governance of firms or markets than the political organization of societies, but his reasoning was guided by the same principle.North ND Thomas applied this reasoning to the nature of feudal institutions arguing that they were an efficient contract between serfs and Lords. While Williamson and North and Thomas do not specify how different parties will reach agreement to achieve efficient institutions, Becker (1960) and Whitman (1989) have invest igated how democracies can reach such agreements via competition among pressure groups and political parties.In their view, an inefficient institution cannot be stable because a political entrepreneur has an incentive to propose a better institution and with the extra surplus generated will be able to make him more attractive to voters. We believe that, despite correctly emphasizing certain forces that are likely to be at work, the efficient institutions view does not provide the right framework for an analysis of the differences in institutions across countries. Both historical and econometric evidence suggests that the economic costs to societies of extractive institutions have been substantial.For example, our estimates in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) suggest that changing Insignia's or Sierra Lens's institutions to those of Chile loud lead, in the long run, to a more than 7-fold increase in these countries' income. It is difficult to argue that these institutions are t herefore efficient for Nigeria, Sierra Leone or many other less-developed countries in Africa or Latin America. In the rest of the paper, we therefore focus on theories of institutions where societies may end up with institutions that are not optimal for aggregate growth or income. 2.The Incidental Institutions View The efficient institutions view is explicitly based on economic reasoning: the costs and benefits of different institutions are weighed against each other to determine which institutions should prevail. Efficiency arises because individuals calculate according to the social costs and benefits. Institutions are therefore choices. A different approach, popular among many political scientists and sociologists, is to downplay choices over institutions, but think of institutions as the byproduct of other social interactions. Here, we discuss three such theories.The first is the theory developed by Barrington Moore (1966) in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, th e second is Till's (1990) and Herb's (2001) theory of state formation, hill the third is Burner's (1976) theory of the emergence of capitalism in England. Barrington Moore constructed his famous theory in an attempt to explain the different paths of political development in Britain, Germany and Russia. In particular, he investigated why Britain had evolved into a democracy, while Germany succumbed to fascism and Russia had a communist revolution.Moore stressed the extent of centralization of agriculture and resulting labor relations in the countryside, the strength of the ‘bourgeoisie,' and the nature of class coalitions. In his theory, democracy emerged when there was a strong, politically assertive, immemorial middle class, and when agriculture had commercialese so that there were no feudal labor relations in the countryside. Fascism arose when the middle classes were weak and entered into a political coalition with landowners.Finally, a agriculture was not commercialese and rural labor was repressed through feudal relationships. In Moor's theory, therefore, class coalitions and the way agriculture is organized determine which political institutions will emerge. Although Moore is not explicitly concerned with economic development, it is a direct implication of his analysis that societies may end up with institutions that do not maximize income or growth, for example, when they take the communist revolution path.While this theory is highly suggestive and clearly captures some of the potentially significant comparative facts there are clear problems with it. For instance, though Moor's remark â€Å"no bourgeoisie, no democracy' is famous, it is not clear from his analysis whether this is Just an empirical correlation or a causal theory. More generally, Moore does not clarify the connection between the formation of class coalitions and political outcomes. It is also not clear whether this theory is empirically successful.There are many examples of societ ies with relatively strong capitalist classes in Latin America, such as Argentina and Chile, which did not make the transition to a consolidated democracy until recently. In fact, in these societies capitalist classes appear to have supported the coups against democracy, suggesting that the role of the poor segments of the society (the working class) in inducing demagnification could be more important than that of the bourgeoisie (see Archduchesses, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, Guacamole and Robinson, Bibb).In a very different vein, Till (1990), building on the Hibernia tradition, proposed a theory of the formation of modern states. He argued extensively that modern state institutions such as fiscal systems, bureaucracy and parliaments are closely related to the need to raise resources to fight wars and thus arose in places with incessant inter-state competition. Herbs (2001) has recently provided a substantive extension of this line of research by applying it to the evolution of st ate institutions in Africa.He argues that the poor functioning of many modern African states is due to the fact that they caked the features–high population density and inter-state warfare— necessary for the emergence of the modern state. Although interesting and sweeping, this theory does not seem to accord well with a number of major facts. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we documented that among the former colonies, it was the less densely settled places that became richer.In fact, North America, Australia and New Zealand were very sparsely settled in 1 500, especially when compared to West Africa around the same time. Despite this, they developed effective states and institutions of private property. This suggests that the issues stressed by Till and Herbs are not the major determinants of institutions, at least, in the context of the development of institutions among the former European colonies, including Africa. Burner's (1976) theory of the rise of capitalism in Europe can also be thought as an example of the incidental institutions view.Although Brenner subscribes to the Marxist view of feudalism as an extractive institution (see next subsection), he interprets the rise of capitalism as the byproduct of the collapse of existing social institutions after the Black Death. Brenner argues that the decline of feudalism resulted from the successful class struggle by the relatively powerful British peasantry. Brenner, however, believes that the peasantry's aim was not to build capitalism; capitalism just emerged like an incidental phoenix from the ashes of feudalism.Because, economic growth required this set of (extractive) institutions to be replaced by capitalist institutions. Therefore, Burner's work also gives us an incidental- institutions theory for why some societies grow faster. None of these theories provide a framework that is at the same time consistent tit the first-order facts of comparative development and useful for generating predictions. Therefore, it is difficult to apply these theories to understand why some countries develop extractive institutions.Moreover, being trained as economists, we find it to be a shortcoming of this group of theories that institutions and political outcomes arise as byproducts, not as the direct consequences of actions taken by rational agents. The fact that the key outcomes are byproducts of other interactions, not choices, leads to the additional problem that these theories often do not generate tight empirical predictions (I. E. Comparative static). But an analysis of comparative development, above all else, requires comparative static results regarding when institutions of private property will emerge.In the remainder of the paper, we therefore focus on the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views to build a simple framework for comparative development. 3. The Rent-seeking View According to this view, institutions are not always chosen by the whole so ciety (and not for the benefit of the whole society), but by the groups that control political power at the time (perhaps as a result of conflict with other groups demanding more rights). These groups will choose the institutions that maximize their own rents, and the institutions that result may not coincide with those that maximize total surplus.For example, institutions that enforce property rights by restricting state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler who wants to appropriate assets in the future. By establishing property rights, this ruler would be reducing his own future rents, so may well prefer extractive institutions to institutions of private property. Therefore, equilibrium institutions will not be those that maximize the size of the overall pie, but the slice of the pie taken by the powerful groups. Why doesn't a Cease theorem type reasoning apply?Although a large literature, especially in industrial organization, has emphasized how informational problems may limit the empirical applications of the Cease theorem, we believe that the main reason for the non-applicability of the Cease theorem in politics is commitment problems (see Guacamole, 2001, for a more detailed discussion of this issue). If a ruler has political power concentrated in his hands, he cannot commit not to expropriate assets or revenues in the future. Effective property rights require that he credibly relinquishes political power to some extent.But according to the Occasion bargain, he has to be compensated for what he could have received using this power. Herein lies the problem. When he relinquishes his power, then he has no guarantees that he will receive the promised payments in the future. Therefore, by their very nature, institutions that regulate political and social power create commitment problems, and prevent Occasion bargains that are necessary to reach efficient outcomes. As an application, consider the decision of a powerful rich elite to mount a coup in a populist redistributive regime, such as that of Salvador Allendale in Chile in 1973.By undertaking a coup, the rich will ensure that economically. Why wouldn't the elite enter into a Occasion bargain with Allendale who would wish to place future restrictions on taxes so as to remove the threat of the coup? The problem, as pointed out and analyzed in Guacamole and Robinson (2001 a), is that the democracy cannot promise not to increase taxes again once the threat of the coup disappears. By its very nature, taxes are set by the politically powerful agents, determined by the institutions at that time.Promises made at the past may be worthless when they are not backed by political power. The first systematic development of this point of view is the economics literature is North (1981), who argued in the chapter on â€Å"A Neoclassical Theory of the State† that agents who controlled the state should be modeled as self-interested. He then argued that the set of property rights wh ich they would choose for society would be those that maximized their payoff and because of transactions costs' these would not necessarily be the set which maximized social welfare.Though his analysis does not clarify what he meant by transactions costs, problems of commitment might be one mispronunciation for this. The notion that elites may opt for extractive institutions to increase their incomes is of course also present in much of the Marxist and dependency theory literature. For example, Dobb (1948), Brenner (1976) and Hilton (1981) saw feudalism, contrary to North and Thomas (1976)g's model, as a set of institutions designed to extract rents from the peasants at the expense of social welfare.Dependency theorists such as Wholesalers (1974-1982), Rodney (1972), Frank (1978) and Cards and Falsetto (1979) argued that the international trading system was designed to extract rents from developing countries to the benefit of developed Mounties. Perhaps, the earliest, and often igno red, contribution to this line of reasoning is in the book by Beard (1913). Anticipating many of the insights of rational choice political science literature, Beard argued that the U. S.Constitution was an institution designed to benefit those who wrote it (such as James Madison) at the expense of the rest of society. Another important example of inefficient institutions designed to extract rents from the society is the Spanish colonial system (Stein and Stein, 1970, Coauthors, 1978, Lockhart and Schwartz, 1983). Finally, the notion that leaver is an inefficient institution designed to extract rents from slaves is also widespread (for example, Williams, 1944, Geneses, 1963, Beckoned, 1972).More recent, and for our purposes more relevant, contributions in this tradition have sought to explain comparative development. For example, in the context of Africa, Bates (1981) formulated an influential and important theory based on rent-seeking by elites. Bates argued that when elites were no t invested in the productive sectors of the economy, mostly agriculture in the context of Africa, and had to rely on urban interests to remain in power, they were likely to distort prices, for example by using marketing boards to transfer resources from the rural areas to the cities.The implications of this for political stability and economic growth were disastrous. Anger and Soulful (1997, 2000) have used related ideas to analyze long-term development in the Americas. They argued that the different paths of development observed in North and Latin America in the last 300 years were due to institutional differences. In North America institutions promoted development, in Latin America they did not. Why did Latin America develop a set of institutions that impeded Caribbean, the factor endowments were suitable for growing crops such as sugarcane.Such crops had large technical scale economies and could be cultivated by slaves, factors that led to large concentrations of landownership an d repressive institutions designed to control labor. Therefore, despite their costs for economic development, extractive institutions were adopted by elites who benefited from the system. On the other hand, in North America, factor endowments were suitable for growing crops with limited scale economies such as wheat, and this led to an egalitarian distribution of land, income and political power.Their theory therefore emphasizes the impact of factor endowments and technology on inequality and institutions building, and ultimately economic development. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000, 2001 a), we developed a complementary theory, emphasizing how European colonialists set up institutions of private property in areas where they settled in large numbers, since these institutions were directly affecting their own investments and well-being. This led us to emphasize how European settlements ere often conducive to the development of institutions of private property in the colonies .In contrast, European colonists introduced or took over existing extractive institutions in other colonies. They were more likely to do so when they did not settle, for example due to an adverse disease environment, and when extractive institutions were more profitable, for example, as in Central America where the densely settled large population could be forced to work for low wages in plantations or mines. These extractive institutions did not benefit the society as a whole, but they were inefficacy for the Europeans, who held the political power and were the extractors.We believe that the rent-seeking view provides the best framework for thinking about why certain countries ended up with extractive institutions, and provides a number of useful comparative static, which will be discussed in Section Ill. 4. The Inappropriate Institutions View According to this view, institutions may be efficient when they are introduced, but they are also costly to change (see below on this). Ther efore, institutions that are efficient for a set of circumstances may no longer be efficient once the environment hinges. Nevertheless, it may be difficult or too costly to change these institutions at this point.The idea here goes back to Crosschecking (1963). In the context of financial institutions, Crosschecking argued that certain arrangements, such as bank finance, might be more appropriate for backward countries trying to catch up. This is widely thought to be a good explanation for why banks are more prevalent in Germany, even today when Germany is no longer a backward country. So perhaps, social arrangements that were introduced at some point as an optimal response to the resistances may continue to prevail, even after they cease to be the optimal response.In the context of financial institutions, this point is developed in Guacamole, Action and Kilobit (2001). Another economic example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. David (1986) argued that this was appropriate at the t ime because it slowed down the speed of typing, when the rudimentary nature of typewriters meant that rapid typing would make them Jam. However, despite the fact that the QWERTY arrangement was inefficient once the basic technology improved soon after, it has similar thesis.Perhaps, extractive institutions were appropriate for certain resistances, but they continue to apply even after they cease to be the efficient institutional arrangement. Related ideas have been suggested in the literature. For example, Wittingly (1957) argued that centralized despotism, which may not have been very costly in terms of economic outcomes in China before the 1 5th century and arose as the result of providing desirable public goods such as irrigation, persisted almost to the present, creating a substantial economic and social burden.Given how long institutions persist (see Section ‘V) the view that institutions of a different age ay continue to apply even when they become costly to economic suc cess is highly plausible. Nevertheless, in the context of comparative development, it appears more useful to combine the inappropriate institutions view with the rent-seeking view, explicitly allowing for political elites to introduce inefficient institutions. In fact, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we suggested a hypothesis combining the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views, and provided evidence in favor of this hypothesis.We argued and empirically demonstrated that extractive institutions, tit power concentrated in the hand of a small elite, were much less costly during the age of agriculture than during the age of industry. When agriculture is the main source of income, and the political elite owns the land, this elite will have, to a first approximation, adequate incentives to increase the productivity of the land. In contrast, in the age of industry, many different agents, not previously part of the ruling elite, need to undertake investments and be involved in productive activities.Without effective property rights, these agents are unlikely to invest, so extractive institutions become much more costly once industrialization opportunities arrive on the scene. This explains why the sugar colonies of Barbados, Haiti and Jamaica were amongst the richest places in the world in 1700 but rapidly fell behind when industrial technologies became available. Overall, we therefore conclude that to understand the significant differences in how countries are organized, we need to move away from the pure efficiency view.Moreover, existing series of institutional differences based on the incidental institutions view cannot provide a satisfactory tarring point, and make less sharp empirical predictions, since institutions are simply byproducts of other social actions. Instead, we believe that conflict over the distribution of rents matters, and the rent seeking view provides the best starting place for an analysis of institutional differences across countries.In addition, there may be an important element of the inappropriate institutions view, so that institutions that were introduced at a certain point in time may become less appropriate and more â€Å"harmful† in the future, but may still remain in place. Ill. Institutional Origins The rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views do not immediately generate a theory of comparative institutions. They simply point out that inefficient institutions may be chosen by political elites, and the institutions in place may become more costly for growth over time.As discussed above, by the institutions hypothesis, we mean that differences in the development experiences of countries can be explained by differences in their institutions. To make this hypothesis operational, we need to choose institutions of private property. In other words, we need to develop comparative static on institution building. This is not an easy task. In fact, some of the pioneering theories of institutions, such as North (1981), give us few clues about when we should expect extractive institutions to prevail.Here, we highlight a few potential determinants of what type of institutions politically powerful groups will choose: 1. Economic Interests: A first determinant of whether institutions of private property will emerge is whether they will lead to outcomes that are in interests of the politically powerful agents. For example, institutions that restrict state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler ho wants to appropriate assets in the future.Yet this strategy may be in the interest of a ruler who recognizes that only such guarantees will encourage citizens to undertake substantial investments or lend him money, or will protect his own rents. They will also be in the interest of the major groups that can undertake investment in production activities in the future. Anger and Solidify explanation for why extractive institutions emerged in the Caribbean but not in North America falls within this category. In the Caribbean, the factor endowments made extractive institutions more profitable for the elite.In particular, sugar production, which could exploit economies of scale and profitably employ slave labor, was conducive to a society where a small elite would control both political and economic power. Our argument in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) for why European settlement in the colonies led to institutions of private property is also based on the same reasoning. When a large number of Europeans settled in an area, they preferred institutions enforcing property rights, since these property rights would enable them to undertake investments.Our argument in Guacamole Johnson and Robinson (2001 a) is also related. There, we suggested that high population density and relative prosperity (I. E. , GAP per capita) of the colonized territory encouraged European colonialists to set up extractive institutions. The reasoning is that high po pulation density implied a large labor force that Europeans could force to work for low wages, and both high population density and the relative prosperity of the population provided Europeans with a greater resource base for extraction or taxation. Economic interests† therefore suggest that we should expect extractive institutions to develop when the powerful agents have little to gain from enforcing property sights because they have few investment opportunities themselves and are not linked to other productive agents in the society, and when there are resources, such as crops or abundant labor, that can be effectively exploited by extractive 2.Political Losers: Another important factor is whether institutional development will destabilize the system, making it less likely that elites will remain in power after reforms. An institutional setup encouraging investment and adoption of new technologies may be blocked by elites when they fear that this process of growth and social change will